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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of a petition for a rehearing in the case, in behalf of the Integrated
Bar.
George Donworth then submitted the report of the committee
on Law Enforcement, recommending the centralization of the
police power by the state, and the abolition of many minor local
enforcement agencies.
Alfred J. Schweppe of Seattle, made a short talk on the work
of the Judicial Council.
The final committee report, and perhaps one of the most im-
portant was made by Tom S. Patterson, Chairman of the Legisla-
tive Committee. This report recommended the preparation and
submission at the next Legislature of a new code for Justice
Courts, embodying many new reforms in the number, qualifications,
jurisdiction, and recall of justices of the peace; the abolition of
the office of constable; an amendment creating a Washington State
Patrol composed of local police officers drafted by executive order,
and a return to the whipping post as a form of punishment for
second felony offenders, and for crimes committed with force or
violence. The recommendation of the whipping post as a form of
punishment, evoked much comment from the floor, and resulted in
a motion to submit the question to a referendum vote of the
members of the bar.
Before adjournment, President Thorgrimson announced the ap-
pointment of Elmer Hayden of the Tacoma Bar as the president
for the ensuing year, and after a short speech of acceptance by
Mr. Hayden, the meeting was adjourned. Visiting members were
then conducted through a garden tour of the Lake region, fol-
lowed by an afternoon of golf and a buffet supper in the evemng
at the Tacoma Golf and Country Club.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF BANK ISSUING LETTER OF CREDIT
WHEN GOODS FAIL TO COMPLY WITH
DOCUMENTARY DESCRIPTION
The decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
(Ninth Circuit) in the case of Contmnental Natwnal Bank v. Na-
tiona City Bank" has reopened the question which received much
attention in the legal and commercial periodicals following the
writing of the opinions in O'Meara v. Naonal Park Bank and
169 F (2d) 812 (1934).
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Laudisi v. Amertcan Exchange Bank- as to the liability of the issu-
ing bank when the goods do not measure up to the description con-
tained in the documents accompanying the draft drawn under the
letter of credit. It seems that the problem can be best understood
by examining the various situations which may arise under a letter
of credit, proceeding from the simple to the more complex.
The letter of credit has been described as a contract between
the buyer and his bank by which the bank in consideration of the
buyer's promise to indemnify it, promises to pay drafts drawn on
the buyer or his bank by the seller or his bank up to the purchase
price of the goods sold by the seller to the buyer. Usually, the
issuing bank will protect itself by providing in the letter of credit
that only those drafts accompanied by certain designated docu-
ments, such as a bill of lading covering the shipment concerned,
commercial invoices, warehouse receipts or delivery orders will be
honored.3 Because the conditions to the bank's obligation are in-
serted for the protection of the bank, as well as for the protection
of the buyer, it has been held that they must be strictly complied
with, the bank being bound to pay the draft if the proper docu-
ments are presented, and bound to not pay the draft if the proper
documents are not presented. 4 Likewise, there is a multitude of
authority to support the statement that the obligation of the
issuing bank is separate and distinct from the contract of sale
between the seller and buyer, its sole duty being to see that pay-
ments are made in accordance with the terms of the promise con-
taind in the letter of credit.'
I. The simple situation is that presented by the cases involving
the letter of credit calling for payment of a draft accompanied by
shipping documents. The issuing bank to be protected in paying
the draft or in refusing to pay the draft, has only to ascertain
whether the documents are those required by the terms of the letter
of credit. Such would be the case in which the letter of credit
called for payment of a draft accompanied by an insurane policy
of a certain type and the seller or his agent failed to present the
insurance policy In that case the issuing bank would be justified
in refusing to honor the draft.
II. A slightly different problem is presented in the cases in
which, while the necessary documents are presented, the form of
'239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636, 39 A. L. R. 747 (1925) 239 M. Y. 234,
146 N. E. 347 (1924).
1 See Mead, "Documentary Letters of Credit," 22 Col. L. Rev. 297
(1922) McCurdy, "Commercial Letters of Credit," 35 Harvard L. Rev. 539,
715. Also, 30 A. L. R. 1310.
Bank of East Asia, Ltd. v. Pang, 140 Wash. 603, 249 P 1060 (1926)
Hibernsa Bank & Trust Co. v. J Aron & Co. Inc., 233 N. Y. S. 486 (1928)
Bank of Italy v. Merchant's National Bank, 236 N. Y. 106, 140 N. E. 211
(1923) Palmer v. Rice, 36 Neb. 844, 55 N. W 256 (1893) Bank v. Grzs-
wold, 76 N. Y. 472 (1878).
rSecond National Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 Fed. 17 (1923)
Bank of Taswan v. Gorgas-Piere Mfg. Co., 273 Fed. 660 (1921) Lamn-born
v. Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co., 188 N. Y. S. 162, 132 N. E. 911 (1921)
Imbrie v. Nagase Co., 187 N. Y. S. 692, 196 App. Div. 380 (1921).
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one of the documents is not as specified in the letter of credit. Thus
in National City Bank v. Seattle National Bank' the letter of credit
read.
"We hereby authorize you to draw for invoice cost
of 155 tons standard white granulated sugar at $23.50
net per hundred pounds packed in double sacks f. o. b.
cars Seattle, Washington. Railroad bills of lading is-
sued to the order of the shipper and indorsed in blank,
together with invoices, certificates of Hongkong Govern-
ment and Lloyd's covering quality, net shipping weights,
inspection and analysis must accompany drafts. "
The documents accompanying the drafts presented to the issuing
bank did not contain the words "standard white granulated
sugar," but did specify that the shipment consisted of "granulated
white sugar, Java No. 24, direct polarization 98.5%." The court
in holding for the issuing bank in an action brought by the buyer
against the bank, said, " in such a case as this it makes no
difference whether the goods tendered were identical with the
goods purchased, the only question being did the documents con-
form to the terms of the letter of credit 9 Not so conforming here,
respondent (issuing bank) was in duty bound to refuse payment
of the draft. "7
III. Proceeding further, we have those cases in which, while the
documents conform to the requirements set forth in the letter of
credit, the goods themselves do not conform to the documentary
description of them.
a. It is clear that the question of the defective quality of the
goods does not concern the issuing bank when the only provision
as to the quality is contained in the contract of sale between the
seller and buyer. Thus in the case of Bank of Plant City v. Canal-
Commercial Trust & Savings Bank8 where the letter of credit
read
"We will honor sight draft of W J Hawkins, bill of
lading attached, covering car of tomatoes on S. Segari
& Co."
it was held that the bank was liable for its refusal to pay the
draft, regardless of the rejection by the buyer of the tomatoes as
1121 Wash. 476, 209 p. 705 (1922).
7 In Manatee County State Bank v. Weatherly, 144 Ala. 655. 39 So. 988
(1905) it was held that the bank was justified in refusing to honor the
draft drawn under a letter of credit for oranges "provided each bill of
lading be accompanied by a certificate that oranges were sound when
shipped and loaded according to the signed contract" where the contract
between the buyer and seller contained stipulations as to size, color and
where the certificate -accompanying the draft merely stated that the
oranges were sound and merchantable when loaded. See also, Lamborn
v. Lake Shore Banking & Trust Co., note 5 supra.
a 270 Fed. 477 (1921).
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unmerchantable. Ordinarily, the sales contract between the buyer
and seller is not part of the contract between the issuing bank
and the buyer, nor is the performance of the sales contract a con-
dition precedent to the letter of credit.
But the New York court has said
"The sole obligation of a bank which issues a letter of
credit is to see that the payments are made in accordance
with the terms thereof, and subject to certain exceptions,
it has no concern with any controversy between buyer
and seller."10
It is not stated what exceptions are meant, but it is reasonable to
suppose that the court is referring to those cases in which the
parties to the letter of credit stipulate in their contract that the
terms of the contract of sale, or of a similar agreement relating
to the quality of the goods shall be read into the letter of credit,
conditioning the liability of the bank.
b. Since the letter of credit is a contract, the parties may include
in its terms any conditions that they desire." They may provide
that the issuing bank shall ascertain the condition of the goods
purchased by the buyer before paying the draft drawn by the
seller for the purchase price. A search of the cases has not re-
vealed a decision based on a letter of credit containing the express
condition that the issuing bank determine whether or not the goods
OIn Laudiss v. Avrnecan Exchange Bank, note 2, supra, the buyer
brought suit against the issuing bank for damages suffered when the
bank made payment of the draft knowing that the goods concerned were
defective. The contract between the buyer and the bank made no mention
of the quality of the grapes to be shipped, but provided.
" It is understood and agreed that you may accept and/or
pay the draft and/or drafts under said letter of credit on
presentation of one copy of the bill of lading together
with invoice and/or other documents required by the letter
of credit."
The grapes were not of the quality purchased. Before the bank had hon-
ored the seller's drafts, the buyer notified it of the breach of the buyer-
seller contract and told the bank to dishonor the draft. The bank paid
the draft on presentation, disregarding the notice. The court in expressing
its approval of the conduct of the bank said.
"The contract between the customer and the bank is entirely
distinct and apart from the contract between such customer
and his vendor. The question between the customer and his
vendor is one whether the goods comply with the contract.
The question between the customer and the bank which
issues the letter of credit is whether the documents presented
with the draft fulfill the specific requirements and if they do,
speaking of such facts as exist in this case, the bank has the
right to pay the draft no matter what may be the defects in
the goods which have been shipped."
Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase National Bank, 205 N. Y. S. 447. 210
App. Div. 179 (1924).
1" Bank of East Asia, Ltd. v. Pang, note 4 supra.
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are as ordered, paying the draft only if it should find in the letter
of credit an express condition to that effect.-2
In Amerscan Natwnal Bank v. PullmaW'3 the Missouri court was
unable to find an agreement that the bank determine whether or
not the peaches shipped to the buyer were of first quality before
paying the drafts presented, nothing appearing in the letter of
credit to indicate that the peaches sold were to be first class.
IV The difficult question is presented when the letter of credit
describes the goods to be shipped with some degree of precision.
The problem then before the court is one of construction. Is the
description of the goods in the letter of credit to be read as requir-
ing that the bank determine whether the goods shipped answer
to the description given 9 This is the situation presented in the
ContinentaZ NatwnaL Bank case.
Plaintiff sues the issuing bank for damages suffered because of
the alleged wrongful refusal of the bank to honor drafts held by
plaintiff and drawn under a letter of credit issued by defendant.
The buyer of cement to be shipped from Brussels arranged with the
defendant bank for the issuance of the letter of credit providing
for payment of drafts accompanied by commercial invoices, con-
sular invoice and other documents against
"shipment of twelve thousand barrels Portland cement.
Cement to be of sound merchantable quality and stand-
ard of the same shall meet with the requirements of the
American Society for testing materials."
Plaintiff presented a sight draft accompamed by the commercial
documents required and a document entitled "a certificate of
quality " However, the bank refused to honor the draft, stating
that the cement did not comply with the specifications in the letter
of credit. Prior shipments of cement from the same seller having
been found to be of inferior quality, the present shipment had
been sampled and tested by a firm of engineers, who found it did
not answer to the tests of the American Society for testing mate-
rials. The bank s course of conduct was based on the premise that
the quality of the cement was to be ascertained before the bank
became liable under the letter of credit. However, the court refused
to find that the compliance of the goods with the standards of the
society was a condition precedent, preferring to cite cases holding
that the letter of credit is a payment against documents, the chief
function of a letter of credit being to substitute bank credit for
buyer's credit and to insure to the seller immediate payment for
goods shipped regardless of the claims of the buyer that the goods
are defective.
11 Continental National Bank v. National City Bank, note 1 supra,
Laudis, v. Amertcan Exchange Bank, -note 9, supra; Camp u. Corn Ex-
change National Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 132 A. 189 (1926).
3Ainzerwan National Bank v. Pullman, 176 Mo. App. 430, 158 S. W 433
(1913).
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The court devotes a good portion of the opinion to a discussion
of the O'Meara case 14 in which the New York court divided on this
problem of conditions in the letter of credit. The letter of credit
covered a "shipment of 1,322 tons of newsprint paper in 72 2"
and 36/2" rolls to test 11-2, 32 lbs." Plaintiff presented the
draft, the required documents, and an affidavit stating that the
paper tested 12 points 32 pounds. Defendant refused to honor the
draft, stating that the plaintiff was required by the terms of the
letter of credit to furnish evidence reasonably satisfactory to the
bank that the paper was as described. The majority of the court
granted plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment, saying,
"The bank's obligation was to pay sight drafts when pre-
sented, if accompanied by genuine documents specified in
the letter of credit. If the paper when delivered did not
correspond to what had been purchased, either in weight,
kind, or quality, then the purchaser had his remedy
against the seller for damages. The bank was under
no obligation to ascertain, either by personal examination
or otherwise, whether the paper conformed to the con-
tract between the buyer and seller. If the drafts when
presented were accompanied by the proper documents,
then it was absolutely bound to make the payment under
the letter of credit, irrespective of whether it knew, or
had reason to believe, that the paper was not of the tensile
strength contracted for."
The court definitely demed the existence of a condition as to tht
quality of the paper when it said.
"The defendant had no right to insist that a test of the
tensile strength of the paper be made before paying the
drafts, nor did it have the right to inspect the paper be-
fore the payment to determine whether it in fact corre-
sponded to the description contained in the documents
The letter of credit did not so provide."
However, a dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Cardozo
and concurred in by Mr. Justice Crane. It is to the effect that while
the bank was under no duty to inspect the goods shipped, yet if
it did investigate and learned that the goods were not as required
under the sales contract it could not be compelled to honor the
draft.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co.15 has been
cited as adopting Cardozo's minority rule. There the letter of
credit called for payment against "negotiable delivery order or
negotiable warehouse receipt invoice in triplicate." The plaintiff
presented two drafts, both of which were dishonored by the issuing
bank, the one because the goods were not in the warehouse although
" Note 2, supra.
'5 297 Fed. 152 (1924).
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the draft was accompaned by what purported to be a warehouse
receipt, the other because the delivery order was not such as was
contemplated by the letter of credit. In affirming the decision
for the defendant bank, the Circuit Court of Appeals and later
the Supreme Court of the United States'6 declared that when the
issuer of a letter of credit is tendered a document which he knows,
although correct m form, to be m fact false, he cannot be compelled
to accept the document as satisfying the terms of the letter of
credit. It would seem that this is an application of the dissenting
opinon m the O'Meara case to a set of- facts involving defective
documents rather than defective goods. This interpretation of the
case is recognized by the court m the ContinentaZ National Ban
case, but is discarded when the court attempts to distinguish the
two cases on their facts, and then says that the court in the Old
Colony Trust case did not intend to lay down the broad rule which
would always permit the bank to refuse to honor drafts if the
goods did not comply with the description of the documents. It
is by this method that the court avoids calling the description of
the goods m the letter of credit a condition which must be satis-
fied before the bank's obligation attaches.1
7
Just what language will be accepted by the courts as creating
the condition that the goods concerned comply with the description
in the letter of credit is not at all clear. However, it is clear that
an issumg bank wishing to protect itself by the inposition of a con-
dition to that effect must incorporate such into the letter of credit
20 265 U. S. 285 (1920).
17 The court also attempts to distinguish Lamborn v. National Bank of
Cownerce, 276 U. S. 469, 48 S. Ct. 378. 72 L. Ed. 657 (1928) on its facts.
Plaintiff sued the issuing bank for damages caused by -the bank's refusal
to pay a draft drawn under a letter of credit providing:
"Shipment to be made during Aug./Sept. 1920 at option of
the sellers from Java by steamer or steamers to Philadel-
phia."
The basis of the bank's refusal to pay was that the ship on which the
sugar was sent had not been continuously destined from Java to Phila-
delphia. The only reference to the quality of the goods was that given in
-the description of the goods covered by the letter of credit. The court,
while holding for the plaintiff, made the statement that "Defendant is
obviously not liable unless there was a tender of sugar which met the
requirements of the letter of credit as to amount and quality of the sugar,
as to time, and as to the manner of shipment " This has been cited
as indicating that the court was in favor of Cardozo's rule. However, the
court's only authority for the statement is a statement from Norrzngton
v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 6 S. Ct. 12, 29 L. Ed. 366 (1885) that "A statement
descriptive of the subject matter, or of some material incident, such as
the time or place of shipment is ordinarily to be regarded as a warranty
in the sense in which that term is used in insurance or maritime law,
that is to say, a condition precedent upon the failure of which the party
aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract." While this is very true
when limited to the facts of the Norrsngton case (installment contract for
iron, contest between the buyer and seller), it is submitted. that it is not
authority for the statement that the mere description of the goods m
the letter of credit conditions the bank's obligation to pay -the drafts
drawn hereunder.
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with such emphasis and clarity that its presence in its intendea
sense cannot be mistaken. A survey of what appears to be the
available cases in the field leaves one very much in doubt as to
what language other than that of express condition will be con-
strued as giving the bank the right to reject the draft if the goods
are not as ordered by the seller.
The mercantile policies in favor of avoiding delay in payment to
the seller, in shifting the risk of defective goods from the accom-
modating bank, and the legal policy of avoiding circuity of action
are fostered by the court's attitude in stressing the fact that the
letter of credit provides for prompt payment against documents.
But it would seem that if the parties to the letter of credit wish
to condition the obligation of the bank, as they seemed to be in
the Contnental NatsonaZ Bank case, they should be allowed to
do so. And it would certainly appear that the language used in
the letter of credit in that case was more the language of condition
than was that used in the O'Meara case, from which it derived
Cardozo's minority rule. MURIEL A. MAWER.
